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How to deal with Belarus? New Approaches 
in EU-Belarus Relations
by Marie-Lena May
The Belarusian regime is under pressure economically and socially. The Minsk metro bombing on 
April 2011, which caused 14 deaths, showed the new instability of  the country. High inflation 
and small foreign currency reserves have led to a deeper dependency on loans from Russia. Since 
the rigged elections and the violent crackdowns on demonstration in December 2010, EU-Belarus 
relations are at a low point. To develop a new EU strategy toward Belarus, the EU should take 
a closer look at the structural developments in the country and approach two groups for a new 
cooperation: the young pro-European society and the disappointed elite.
On April 11, 2011, a bomb exploded in the metro 
in Belarus’ capital city Minsk, leading to the death 
of  14 people. This clearly marks a new instabil-
ity in the country. Belarus used to be an island 
of  stability in the post-Soviet area, supported by 
economic growth and social security subsidized 
by Russia. But this system has been teetering since 
the global financial crises. Inflation reached 8.75% 
between January and March, and Belarus’ reserves 
of  foreign currencies are so short that no foreign 
currency is available in the country. To solve these 
challenges the regime bargains about loans from 
Russia, thereby becoming more dependent on its 
neighbor to the East.
For the EU, this raises the question of  how to deal 
with Belarus. Belarus is an exception in the Eastern 
Dimension of  the European Neighborhood Policy. 
Diplomatic activity with the autocratic regime is close 
to nonexistent, and Belarus is the only member of  
EU’s Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative without a 
partnership and cooperation agreement. In compari-
son to the other EaP countries, cooperation, instru-
ments and financial aid are much more limited. Fur-
thermore, the ruling elite in Belarus does not intend 
to enter the EU, but to consolidate an independent 
Belarus in close cooperation with Russia. Thus, 
EU accession as long-term goal and incentive for 
change—the most successful EU foreign policy until 
now—cannot be utilized in EU-Belarus relations.
To develop a new EU strategy toward Belarus, 
the EU should take a closer look at the structural 
developments and the mechanism in Belarus and 
identify new approaches for cooperation. This 
paper gives, first, an overview on the challenges 
Belarus currently faces and, second, identifies two 
focal groups for a new EU strategy toward Belarus: 
the young pro-European society and the disap-
pointed elite.
Insights into the Belarusian power 
system
President Alexander Lukashenko has ruled Belarus 
since 1994. In 2004 a referendum changed the con-
stitution to eliminate presidential term limits and 
open the door for him to run indefinitely. Having 
consolidated its power, the authoritarian regime 
relied on the three following pillars:
Pillars of Belarus’ power system
Autocratic system 
with strong security 
apparatus and con-
trol of  the media.
Economic growth 
and social realloca-
tion based on sub-
sidies from Russia: 
hush-money for 
Belarusians and the 
elite.
Foreign and secu-
rity seesaw policy 
between sovereignty 
and dependence on 
Russia.
Table 1: Columns of Belarus’ power system in the past years (author’s classification)
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Autocratic system with a strong security 
apparatus and control of the media
The mechanism of  internal power sustainability 
in Belarus is based on autocratic centralism with a 
clear hierarchy and loyalty toward the President. In 
addition, Lukashenko constantly reshuffles power-
ful positions to prevent anyone else from gaining 
too much power. The last rotation took place right 
after the elections in December 2010, when he 
replaced the prime minister and other politicians 
considered more pro-European and pro-liberaliza-
tion. By keeping the economy state-owned and 
closed from international markets, no oligarchies 
could develop in the transition period after the 
dissolution of  the Soviet Union. Ironically, what 
has ensured his power for 17 years is now one of  
the main problems: the non-reformed Soviet-style 
industry that produces goods that cannot compete 
on the global market.
In recent years, Lukashenko also established a 
patrimonial system, installing his family in political 
and economic posts. His son Viktor is one of  his 
close counsellors. His youngest extra-marital son, 
six-year-old Kolya, seems to be kind of  a “mascot” 
accompanying him to social and political events. 
Some voices say that Kolya is meant to be his 
successor.
In addition, the Belarusian power system fun-
damentally relies on a well-functioning security 
apparatus. The firm crackdown of  the protests in 
December 2010 showed the effectiveness of  the 
police and the Belarusian security agency KGB. 
The trials afterward once more revealed the judi-
ciary’s lack of  independence and the violations of  
human rights in Belarusian prisons.
Finally, the state-controlled media, which function 
as an organ of  the autocratic regime, form the last 
piece of  the autocratic system’s foundation. After 
the metro bombing, two independent newspapers 
(Nasha Niva and Narodnaya Volya) were targets of  
searches and were threatened with closure. Out 
of  178 countries, Belarus ranks 154th on the Press 
Freedom Index 2010, the last place in Europe.1 
Basically the only source for non-regime-controlled 
information in Belarus is the internet. It is widely 
used by the opposition, but also by the public. A 
regulation on the internet in 2010 offers the pos-
sibility to censor websites, though it so far has only 
rarely been used.
It is difficult to judge whether there are cracks 
in the Belarusian power system. The most obvi-
ous division is within the economic elite. Parts 
of  the elite prefer market liberalization to the 
state-controlled economy. The hesitant reforms to 
liberalize the economy in the last two years have 
disappointed them. These circles could be open 
to a regime change as soon as Lukashenko can no 
longer pay them off. Until now, he has stifled criti-
cism by re-distributing rewards among the elite. But 
if  the economic situation worsens, he will not have 
the means to offer substantial enough payoffs.
Economic growth and social stability based 
on subsidies from Russia
Economic growth was the most important pillar 
of  Lukashenko’s power. The Belarusian economy 
performed much better than other former Soviet 
countries like neighboring Ukraine (e. g. in 2008 
10.2% growth of  GDP in comparison to 2.1% in 
Ukraine).2 The system relied on subsidies from 
Russia in gas and loans, and on the open Rus-
sian market for Belarusian products. This allowed 
Lukashenko to guarantee social equality and secu-
rity and to project the image of  being the only war-
rantor of  stability and prosperity for Belarus.
The global financial crisis has weakened this system. 
On the one hand, Russia had economic troubles 
itself  and has started an economization of  its for-
eign policy. Russia raised its gas prices, and Belarus 
had to make concessions in order to avoid an ever 
higher price. As a result, Belarus sold parts of  its 
pipeline system to Russian investors and joined the 
Customs Union with Russia and Kazakhstan. On 
the other hand, demands for Belarusian goods in 
their main markets, Russia and Ukraine, have fallen 
sharply because of  their own economic decline. It 
became clear that Belarusian products are not com-
petitive on the global market. In 2010, the Belaru-
sian GDP officially grew by a mere 0.2%. But even 
this low figure might be fabricated in order to dis-
play (if  only marginal) economic growth.
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Belarus has not been able to recover from these 
hardships. The rating agency Standard & Poors 
reduced the credit rating for Belarus from B+ to B 
in March 2011 with a negative outlook.3 Economic 
problems include the increasing negative trade bal-
ance, public debts, and high public spending (which 
Lukashenko needs in order to secure the loyalty 
of  the people and especially of  the administrative 
elite and the security apparatus). The International 
Monetary Fund gave Belarus loans in 2009 and 
2010, but now warns that Belarus’ net international 
currency reserves are too small after a 20% reduc-
tion at the beginning of  2011. The IMF suggests a 
devaluation of  the Belarusian rouble and far-reach-
ing structural reforms.4 Up to now, the government 
has not followed this advice because it fears social 
unrest. To the contrary, by the end of  2010—just 
before the presidential elections—public sector 
wages were significantly raised.
Yet the plan did not work out: The de facto 
exchange rate dropped to approximately 25% of  
the official exchange rate in March 2011. People 
in Belarus can no longer access foreign currencies 
or gold reserves,5 which is a serious problem for 
many people because rents or goods often need to 
be paid for in euros or dollars. In March and April 
2011 the prices for fuel, bred and other products 
of  daily use increased; inflation from January until 
March 2011 was officially estimated to be 8.75% 
(the official outlook for the whole year).6 People 
have started to stockpile.
Economic decline will increase widespread weariness 
and probably lead to rising social instability. A grow-
ing number of  Belarusians do not see the current 
regime as being able to secure economic growth. In 
a public opinion poll of  the Independent Institute 
of  Socio-Economic and Political Studies in March 
2011, 26.9% stated that their economic situation 
has worsened in comparison to 16.0% in December 
2010 and 12.2% in 2006 after the previous presi-
dential elections. Only 29.2% of  Belarusians believe 
that the economic situation will improve in the 
near future. Trust in Lukashenko dropped to 47.9% 
by March 2011 from 55% in December 2010 and 
60% in 2006.7 Until now, people have reacted rather 
calmly. There were occasional demonstrations, e. g. 
by car owners against the high fuel prices, but so far 
fear of  regime crackdown has kept demonstrations 
from reaching a critical mass.
Foreign and security seesaw policy between 
sovereignty and dependence on Russia
Without Russia as a close partner the first two pil-
lars of  the Belarusian power system would not 
stand. Thus, in foreign and security policy, Belarus 
is equally focused on Russia, but tries to balance 
Moscow’s influence to safeguard its sovereignty. 
This seesaw foreign policy combines four strategic 
measures:
– Integration in multilateral organizations under 
Russia’s influence, like the Collective Security 
Treaty Organization or the Customs Union with 
Russia and Kazakhstan
– Economic cooperation with former Soviet repub-
lics, especially Ukraine
– Loose cooperation with the EU, USA and inter-
national (“Western”) organizations
– Pragmatic network with countries like China, 
Venezuela or Cuba.
This balance is now threatened by changes in Rus-
sian foreign policy. Since the beginning of  2011, 
Belarus has been negotiating terms for loans from 
Russia and the Eurasian Economic Community 
(EurAsEC). Lukashenko has been trying to buy 
time for a better bargaining position, but his posi-
tion remains weak. Economic strains are weighing 
on him, and his ability to play Russia and the West 
against each other is limited now that the EU and 
USA have reinstated an isolation policy toward 
Minsk. The loan negotiations are scheduled to fin-
ish in mid-May.8
Lukashenko cannot rely on other partners for 
help either. China, which supported Belarus with 
loans in the past, does not show great interest 
in investing in Belarus as it boasts no significant 
resources. Venezuela offered oil, but high trans-
port costs make it more expensive than Russian 
oil. As Belarus is landlocked, it needs either access 
to a Ukrainian or a Baltic Sea harbor to receive 
Venezuelian oil. Other potential partners like Cuba 
or Libya are struggling with their own serious eco-
nomic and political problems.
Mai 2011 | DGAPanalyse kompakt | Nr. 2

This shows that Belarus still needs the EU for 
counterbalancing the steadily growing Russian 
influence. The regime, therefore, can hardly reject 
all proposals.
New EU policy toward Belarus
In view of  the constellation of  power in Belarus, 
the EU should rethink its strategy. Two societal 
groups are particularly prone to fuel political 
change: pro-European youth (parts of  2c in the 
table below) and the disappointed economic elites 
(parts of  1a).
Broadly speaking, Belarusian society is divided into 
two groups with different subgroups:
1) The supporters of the current regime, mainly 
composed of two subgroups
2) The opponents of the current regime, mostly pro-European and mainly 
composed of three subgroups:
a) Active Supporters
Beneficiaries of  the system 
who gain from financial 
distributions and unofficial 
rules, like the administra-
tive and economic elite and 
the security apparatus
If  the economic decline 
continues, a split in this 
group is possible. The 
disappointed parts of  the 
elite are a starting point for 
the EU.
b) Passive Supporters
The neutral, apolitical 
segments of  society that 
prefer stability and security. 
It is probably the biggest 
group, including farmers, 
the elderly and less-edu-
cated lacking access to 
independent information. 
a) Active Opponents
The active opposition 
forms a small part of  
Belarusian society. After 
the presidential elections, 
many opponents were 
detained and some are still 
in prison. The forces are 
therefore weakened and 
the opposition needs time 
to recover. But the brutal 
actions of  the regime can 
also help to unify and 
strengthen the opposition 
in the next years. 
b) The Civil Society
There is an active and 
heterogeneous civil society 
operating in different fields 
like environment, social 
and health issues and 
education. They are not 
politically active in a nar-
rower sense. Their goal is 
to change the situation in 
a special and defined area, 
not to actively overthrow 
the regime. 
c) Frustrated
The well-educated parts 
of  the society that feel 
the lack of  opportunities 
because of  the country’s 
isolation. The rigged elec-
tion and the suppression 
of  protests, as well as 
the dire economic situa-
tion have led to a loss of  
regime credibility. This 
group wants an end to the 
country’s isolation and pre-
fers EU integration.
Table 2: Division of Belarusian Society (author’s classification)
An opinion poll published in March 20119 showed 
that the division of  society coincides with two dif-
ferent perceptions of  what is happening in Belarus. 
For example, 47.7% think that the authorities acted 
in the right way on December 19, whereas 42.4% 
disagree. The question “A. Lukashenko has become 
president of  the country again. Did you person-
ally want it?” was answered with “yes” by 46.2% 
while 43.2% responded “no.” Belarusian society is 
also divided on who is seen as responsible for the 
metro bombing in April: Regime supporters believe 
the official interpretation of  an oppositional attack. 
Opponents, however, think the inner power circle 
faked an insurgent terrorist attack in order to dis-
credit the opposition.10
Charming the young pro-European 
Belarusians
For the EU, group 2a) and 2b) were the obvious 
cooperation partners in the past, and, of  course, 
they will and should remain so in future. But the 
EU should additionally see that the young and well-
educated Belarusians (group 2c) are an important 
starting point for new engagement. The pro-Euro-
pean part of  the society could form the future 
ruling elite. But of  course, it could just as easily be 
a future of  pro-Russians elites. Currently, a slight 
majority of  Belarusians (50.4%) would rather join 
the EU than integrating with Russia (31.5%).
The EU would do well to reply to this plea, to 
offer attractive programs and promote the EU in 
Belarus. EU member states should start imple-
menting the post-election promises of  civil society 
support announced at the international donor 
conference in Warsaw in February 2011. German 
Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle promised 
6.6 million Euros for 2011,11 and the European 
Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbor-
hood Policy, Štefan Füle, 17.3 million euro during 
2011–2013.12 The EU might lose credibility if  it 
now directs all its support efforts toward North-
ern Africa and forgets about the Belarus promises. 
This includes supporting the EaP’s Civil Society 
Forum with an office of  its own, offering more 
scholarships for students and young profession-
als, establishing an independent Belarus Fund 
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for Civil Society Projects, and introducing visa 
facilitations.
Contacts to the disappointed elite
Besides intensifying its engagement in Belarus, 
the EU should build reliable networks with disap-
pointed forces among Belarusian economic and 
political elite. Through the cautious economic 
liberalization started two years ago, new indepen-
dent elites emerged and can gain influence in the 
country. Contacts should be made and support and 
cooperation considered. Excluding Belarus now 
from the Eastern Partnership Initiative would be a 
wrong signal, because EaP’s multilateral dimension 
offers contacts between executives and experts on 
a low and medium level.
The EU Delegation in Minsk should play a keyrole, 
expand its activities and fulfill the need of  a lively 
contact point between Belarus and the EU. Ger-
many together with Belarus’ neighboring EU coun-
tries (Poland, Latvia and Lithuania) should push the 
Eastern Dimension in the EU to keep it high on 
the agenda. The insurgencies in Northern Africa 
painfully revealed the unpreparedness of  the EU 
and its lack of  knowledge of  and contact with non-
governmental actors in the region. If  it remains 
inactive and inattentive to Belarus now, the EU 
risks once again being caught flat-footed by change 
in its neighborhood.
Marie-Lena May, Program Officer, Center for 
Central and Eastern Europe of the Robert Bosch 
Stiftung, DGAP.
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